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I. INTRODUCTION
A multi-billion-dollar industry,1 consistently rated among the most
profitable in the world,2 was handed a controversial victory by the
Supreme Court in June 2011—a ruling that puts almost every American
family at risk.  The industry is the generic-pharmaceutical industry and 
the court ruling is PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, which lets generic manufacturers 
off the hook for legal liability when their products cause harm.3  The  
average consumer may not know it, but as of last June, generics and name-
brand drugs differ significantly, not in their chemical make-up, but in the 
legal protections consumers have if something goes wrong.  Patients who 
choose generics—or who have them chosen by their insurance
company, pharmacist, or doctor—unknowingly give up their ability to 
sue under state law. 
To illustrate: two patients walk into a pharmacy and get prescriptions
filled for the same ailment.  One buys a brand-name drug, the other a 
generic.  Both medicines have identical ingredients, provide the same 
health benefit, and have labels that match word for word.  Unfortunately,
both patients suffer devastating harm because the labels fail to disclose
known serious side effects.  Thanks to PLIVA, one patient can seek legal 
remedy to recover expensive costs.  The other cannot.
Generics have been promoted by government policy over the last three 
decades as a way to improve the health of Americans by reducing the
costs of prescription drugs.  Indeed, when a generic is available today,
consumers will buy it 90% of the time.4 Overall, more than 75% of all 
drugs sold in the United States are now generic.5  In a twist of fate,
however, the very success of generics now poses a threat: millions of 
Americans suddenly find themselves at huge financial risk should
something go terribly wrong because of their prescription medicine. 
Buying a generic drug now carries a steep downside.  It was not supposed to
be like this. 
1. Zacks Equity Research, Pharmaceutical Industry Outlook - March 2011, ZACKS
INVESTMENT RES. (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.zacks.com/commentary/17173/Pharmaceutical
+Industry+Outlook (“According to IMS Health, the global pharmaceutical industry should 
record growth of 5–7% in 2011 representing sales of approximately $880 billion.”). 
2. Major Pharma ranks twentieth out of the 215 top industry profit margin ranks.
Industry Summary, YAHOO! FIN. (Aug. 21, 2012),  http://biz.yahoo.com/p/sum_qpmd.html. 
3. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2577–82 (2011). 
4. See OFFICE OF SCI. & DATA POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 3–4 (2010) [hereinafter 
EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS] (citing ALAN SHEPPARD, GENERIC MEDICINES: 
ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS TO THE LONG-TERM HEALTH OF SOCIETY 3 (2010), available at
http://www.imshealth.com/imshealth/Global/Content/Document/Market_Measurement_TL/
Generic_Medicines_GA.pdf). 
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It has been almost thirty years since Congress streamlined the drug 
approval process in an effort to bring generic drugs to market quickly 
after the brand-name patents expired.6  The goal was to give consumers 
the same health benefits at a much lower cost.  With regulatory relief and 
increased competition, generics became wildly successful.  The generic-
pharmaceutical industry, consumers, the health care industry, and taxpayers 
all benefited. PLIVA, however, now casts a frightening shadow over the 
financial savings of generics. The economic benefits of generics may
now be outweighed by the legal risks, at least for those unfortunate 
consumers who are harmed by generic prescription drugs. 
The controversial five-to-four decision that overturned two circuit 
court cases7 puts millions in jeopardy. Now that seven out of every ten 
drugs sold is a generic, PLIVA effectively means that seven out of ten 
consumers lack legal remedy.  Moreover, the immunity granted by the 
ruling could increase the number of patients who actually suffer harm
because now generic-pharmaceutical companies have no incentive to 
police themselves and the highly profitable products they sell.
How did we create such an unfair predicament (even the majority
opinion called it “bizarre”8) and what should be done to protect millions 
of consumers?  This Article takes a look at the growth of the multi-
billion-dollar pharmaceutical industry and its unprecedented clout; how 
PLIVA was decided and why the decision was wrong; what the implications 
are for consumers and other stakeholders; and what solutions might 
remedy a controversial decision that radically alters the legal landscape
of one of the most profitable and powerful industries in the world.
6. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. 
No. 98-417, §§ 101–103, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–97 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 355 (2006)).
7. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572–73. 
8. Id. at 2582 (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 129 S. Ct. 2710, 2733




























II. THE GENERIC-PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY AND ITS EVOLUTION 
VIA LEGISLATION AND MARKET FORCES
Although many factors have played a role in the generic drug industry’s
rapid growth—the lack of innovation in brand-name prescription drugs 
and the increasing costs to produce those drugs,9 coupled with the
intense pressure to control health care costs10—the most important force
driving the generic market has been legislative efforts by both the 
federal government and the states.11 
In 1984, landmark legislation brought generic drug manufacturing to 
the forefront of the pharmaceutical industry.12  The Drug Price Competition 
and Patent Term Restoration Act, also known as the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments, changed the approval process for generics.13  The purpose 
behind Congress’s enactment of Hatch-Waxman was “to make available 
more low cost generic drugs by establishing a generic drug approval 
procedure” distinct from the procedure for brand-name drugs.14  The  
amendments provide that generic drug manufacturers only need to show 
that a generic drug and its brand-name equivalent are the same in almost
all respects.15  Hatch-Waxman does not require generic drug makers to
prove a product’s safety and efficacy independently, which brand-name 
drug manufacturers must do.16  As a result, generic manufacturers can 
bring drugs to market for a much lower cost and in a much shorter time.
9. Clifford Mintz, Why Generic Drug Companies Will Dominate Future 
Pharmaceutical Markets, BIOJOBBLOG (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.biojobblog.net/20
10/02/01/why-generic-drug-companies-will-dominate-future-pharmaceutical-markets/. Mintz 
asked, “[I]s it any wonder why Pfizer is thinking about entering the generic-
pharmaceutical business and that Western drug companies are shedding scientists and 
sales people in the US and Europe and growing the sizes of their R&D and sales force 
staffs in Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America?” Id.
10. Doris de Guzman, On a High: Generic Drug Sales Continue To Climb, ICIS 
(Feb. 10, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2010/02/15/9333169/generic-
drugs-sales-continue-to-climb.html. 
11. This Article also recognizes, however, that market forces and federal and state
legislation go hand in hand—legislation on generic drugs has been made to address the
market forces plaguing the drug industry, such as increasing health care costs.  Thus,
market forces and legislation both affect the generic market.
12. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 
(2006)). 
13. Id. 
14. H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, at 14 (1984). 
15. The generic manufacturer must show that the generic drug has the same active 
ingredients as the brand-name drug, that the manner of administration, dosage form, and
strength of the generic drug are the same as the brand-name drug, and that the generic 
drug is “bioequivalent” to the brand-name drug. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(ii)–(iv).
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States have also enacted legislation to promote the growth of generic 
pharmaceuticals.17  Almost all states authorize pharmacists to substitute 
generic drugs for brand-name drugs when filling prescriptions, for 
example.18  Moreover, both state and federal insurance plans—as well 
as private ones—promote the use of generic drugs over brand-name drugs.19 
Combined with other market forces, these government policies fueled
phenomenal growth in generics.  In 1984, generic sales made up less than
19% of all pharmaceuticals sold in the United States.20  That rate steadily
grew to reach 75% in 2009, about a four-fold increase over twenty-five
years.21  Generic drug manufacturers sold an estimated $66 billion worth
of generic drugs in the United States that year.22  Globally, from 2008 to
2009, generic prescription drug sales climbed by 7.7%, compared to
5.7% growth in the overall global pharmaceutical industry.23  Today,
90% of prescriptions for brand-name drugs are being filled by their 
generic equivalent if there is one.24 
Pharmaceutical drug manufacturing is consistently rated one of the 
largest and most profitable industries in the world, making hundreds of 
billions of dollars annually.25  For example, in January 2011, several of
the world’s largest pharmaceutical companies reported multi-billion-
17. See EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 4, at 7. 
18. Thomas P. Christensen et al., Drug Product Selection: Legal Issues, 41 J. AM.
PHARMACEUTICAL ASS’N 868, 869 (2001).  In some states, legislation permits generic 
drug substitution but only under certain circumstances.  EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC 
DRUGS, supra note 4, at 7. Other states permit generic drug substitution but do not make
generic substitution a requirement.  Id.  Others only permit it if there is patient consent. 
Id.
19. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING GENERIC DRUGS ON MEDICARE’S 
PRESCRIPTION DRUG SPENDING 9 box 1 (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/ 
default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/118xx/doc11838/09-15-prescriptiondrugs.pdf; JEFFREY S. 
CROWLEY ET AL., KAISER COMM’N ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED, STATE MEDICAID 
OUTPATIENT PRESCRIPTION DRUG POLICIES: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY, 2005 
UPDATE 10 (2005), available at http://www.kff.org/medicaid/upload/state-medicaid-
outpatient-prescription-drug-policies-findings-from-a-national-survey-2005-update-
report.pdf. 
20. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS 
HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 27 (1998),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf.
21. EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 4, at 2. 
22. Brief for Marc T. Law et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 15,
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-993). 
23. Guzman, supra note 10. 
24. EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 4, at 3–4 (citing SHEPPARD, 
supra note 4, at 3). 


























dollar fourth quarter revenues.26  AstraZeneca PLC reported revenues of 
$8.62 billion, Eli Lilly & Co. reported revenues of $6.19 billion, Bristol
Myers Squibb Co. reported $5.11 billion, and Novartis reported $14.2 
billion.27  Analysts predict that market growth in the pharmaceutical 
industry will continue at an annual rate of 4%–7% through 2013, and that 
the size of the global pharmaceutical market will exceed $975 billion, 
with the U.S. market, the largest, driving much of that growth.28 
The generic drug market is predicted to be the main sector to lead this 
anticipated growth.29  Not only are the current generic drug market trends
predicted to continue, but industry analysts also report that over the 
course of the next five years, the generic drug market is positioned to
incur rapid expansion due to the fact that “patents on many blockbuster 
drugs [are set to] expire”: 
This year, for example, generic drug manufacturers will be able to make and 
sell drugs whose patents expire in 2011. These drugs had annual sales of $15.3 
billion under patent in 2010, and will be new markets for generic 
manufacturers.  Next year, the market value of drugs entering the generics 
market will double; drugs losing patent protection in 2012 accounted for $33.2
billion in sales last year.  In the US alone, drugs with a combined $133 
[billion] in annual sales will enter the generics market from 2011 to 2016.30 
In the past year, seven of the world’s twenty most popular drugs became 
available in generic form.31  The cholesterol drug Lipitor, used by
4.3 million Americans, went generic in November 2011, and the blood 
thinner Plavix, used by 1.4 million, in May 2012.32  By 2016, many other 
common drugs such as Lexapro, Avandia, Lunesta, and Singulair, having
roughly $255 billion in global sales, will also be available in generic 
form.33  It is estimated that “[m]ore than $100 billion in annual brand-
name drug sales will be at risk for generic competition from 2011 to 
2015 . . . [which is] about one-third of the annual spending on all 
prescription drugs in the U.S.”34  As a result of this anticipated surge in 
26. Pharmaceutical Earnings Roundup: AZN, BMY, LLY, NVS, DYNAMIC DIVIDEND 
(Jan. 27, 2011), http://dynamicdividend.com/pharmaceutical-earnings-roundup-azn-bmy-
lly-nvs/.
27. Id. 
28. Mintz, supra note 9. 
29. See Steven M. Rogé, Hi-Tech Pharmacal: Bright Future in Generic Drugs, 
SEEKING ALPHA (June 28, 2011), http://seekingalpha.com/article/276949-hi-tech-pharmacal-
bright-future-in-generic-drugs. 
30. Id. 
31. Ben Tracy, Popular Medications Are Going on the Cheap, CBS NEWS (July 
25, 2011, 6:51 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18563_162-20083186.html. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Bruce Japsen, Big Savings Ahead as Patents Expire, CHI. TRIB., May 5, 2011, 
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generics, “[p]harmacies and health insurance plans are expected to step 
up marketing and education to get consumers to use generics.”35 
Generic-pharmaceutical corporations are now setting their sights on 
also taking over emerging international markets, such as China, India,
Brazil, and Eastern European countries.36  In emerging markets, the
potential for growth is higher and competition is smaller than in existing 
markets.37  Moreover, consumers in these emerging markets are concerned 
about brands, more so than in the existing markets, and generic-
pharmaceutical companies can sell their generics as “brands,” or rather,
branded generics.38  In May 2009, U.S.-based corporation Pfizer, the
largest pharmaceutical company in the world, announced its growing
relationships with the India-based firm Aurobindo, and Indian injectable
generics specialist Claris Lifesciences.39  In 2010, Pfizer became involved
in a bidding war against Teva Pharmaceutical Industries—a defendant in
PLIVA, in fact—for the acquisition of German-based Ratiopharm, which 
as of 2009 held 3% of the global generics market.40 
So, what does this all mean and how does it relate to PLIVA?  The 
answer: profits, losses and liability, and power.  The pharmaceutical
industry is one of the most profitable in the world, with the generic drug 
market as the current and predicted future industry leader.41  Profits and 
losses of pharmaceutical corporations are riding on the continued success 
of the generics market.42 Market analyses show that in the upcoming 
decade the generic market is predicted to increase by an exponential margin,
as brand-name patents are set to expire,43 and furthermore, that generic
pharmaceuticals are moving into emerging markets with expectations of 
35. Id. 
36. Guzman, supra note 10.  Although many of these pharmaceutical corporations are 
part of the global market for international generic sales, they are also now looking for 
markets previously closed to generic activity. Id. 
37. Clay Boswell, Pharma Enters Emerging Markets via Generics, ICIS (Oct. 7,
2009, 9:00 AM), http://www.icis.com/Articles/2009/10/12/9253207/pharma-enters-emerging- 
markets-via-generics.html.
38. Id. 
39. See Pfizer Ties Up with Aurobindo, Claris, FIN. EXPRESS (May 21, 2009, 12:59
AM), http://www.financialexpress.com/news/pfizer-ties-up-with-aurobindo-claris/463100/0.  
In fact, “Pfizer acquired the rights to market 55 solid oral dose products and five sterile 
injectable products in more than 70 emerging markets through its May 2009 deal with 
Aurobindo.”  Boswell, supra note 37. 
40. Guzman, supra note 10. 
41. See supra notes 25–29 and accompanying text. 
42. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 





























gain and continued profitability.44  The stakes are high.  Unfavorable
lawsuits against these corporations could have substantial financial
costs—potentially hundreds of millions of dollars per plaintiff.  The
PLIVA victory was a huge win for the generic-pharmaceutical industry
because now these highly profitable corporations are insulated from state
tort liability and potential stigma if they sell drugs without adequate 
warnings and patients suffer as a result. 
III. PLIVA’S LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
A. The PLIVA Decision: Shielding Generic Drug            
Manufacturers from State Tort Law Liability 
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court held in PLIVA that federal statutes 
and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations preempted state 
tort claims by requiring that generic prescription drugs have the same
safety and efficacy labeling as brand-name prescription drugs.45 In 
reversing the rulings of both the Fifth and Eighth Circuits, which found
that preemption did not exist,46 the Court reasoned that federal law and
state law requirements for generic drug labeling were in conflict such
that it was impossible for generic drug manufacturers to comply with 
both federal and state law.47  In essence, the Court introduced “a critical 
distinction between brand-name and generic drugs.”48  The federal statutes
and regulations that apply to generic prescription drug manufacturers
differ from those applicable to brand-name prescription drug manufacturers, 
which leads to different preemption results.49  In effect, the Court created 
a divide between consumers exercising their right to access the courts
because “[c]onsumers of brand-name drugs can sue manufacturers for
inadequate warnings; consumers of generic drugs cannot.”50 
The PLIVA decision arose out of two separate suits filed in the Fifth 
and Eighth Circuits.51  In the early 2000s, plaintiffs Julie Demahy and
Gladys Mensing were prescribed Reglan and both received the drug’s
44. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
45. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2572 (2011). 
46. See id. at 2582; see also Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 
2010), rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. 2567; Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 
611–12 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. 2567.  Although not joined in
the case, the Ninth Circuit dealt with a similar situation, finding for plaintiffs on the basis 
of no preemption.  See Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. Co., 630 F.3d 1225, 1230, 1234 (9th Cir. 
2011), vacated by L. Perrigo Co. v. Gaeta, 132 S. Ct. 497 (2011). 
47. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2580–81. 
48. Id. at 2593 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
49. See id. 
50. Id. 
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generic equivalent, metoclopramide, from their pharmacists.52  After
taking the generic drug for a number of years, both plaintiffs developed 
tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological disorder.53  There was existing 
evidence that long-term use of metoclopramide can lead to tardive
dyskinesia—studies had shown that up to 29% of patients who have taken
the drug for several years develop tardive dyskinesia.54  As a result, 
the warning labels for the generic drug had been “strengthened and
clarified several times” over the course of several decades.55  The  
plaintiffs, who sued under state tort law,56 alleged that they had suffered
damages due to their long-term use of metoclopramide, which led to 
their tardive dyskinesia.57 The plaintiffs asserted that the manufacturers 
52. See Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub 
nom. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. 2567; Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 
2009), rev’d sub nom. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. 2567. 
53. See Wyeth, 588 F.3d at 605; see also Actavis, 593 F.3d at 430. 
54. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2572 (citing McNeil v. Wyeth, 462 F.3d 364, 370 n.5 (5th 
Cir. 2006); and Douglas Shaffer, Tardive Dyskinesia Risks and Metoclopramide Use 
Before and After U.S. Market Withdrawal of Cisapride, 44 J. AM. PHARMACISTS ASS’N
661, 663 (2004) (noting that eighty-seven cases of metoclopramide-related tardive
dyskinesia were reported to the FDA’s adverse event reporting system by mid-2003)). 
55. Id. at 2572. 
In 1985, the label was modified to warn that “tardive dyskinesia . . . may
develop in patients treated with metoclopramide,” and the drug’s package
insert added that “[t]herapy longer than 12 weeks has not been evaluated and
cannot be recommended.” In 2004, the brand-name Reglan manufacturer
requested, and the FDA approved, a label change to add that “[t]herapy should 
not exceed 12 weeks in duration.”  And in 2009, the FDA ordered a black box 
warning—its strongest—which states: “Treatment with metoclopramide can cause
tardive dyskinesia, a serious movement disorder that is often irreversible . . . .  
Treatment with metoclopramide for longer than 12 weeks should be avoided in 
all but rare cases.” 
Id. at 2572–73 (citations omitted). 
56. See id. at 2573.  In the relevant states, tort law requires that a drug
manufacturer that is or should be aware of its product’s danger to label that product in 
such as way as to make the product reasonably safe.  Minnesota law requires that “where 
the manufacturer . . . of a product has actual or constructive knowledge of danger to 
users, the . . . manufacturer has a duty to give warning of such dangers.”  Frey v.
Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 788 (Minn. 1977).  Similarly, Louisiana law
states that “a manufacturer’s duty to warn includes a duty to provide adequate
instructions for safe use of a product.”  Stahl v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 283 F.3d 254,
269–70 (5th Cir. 2002); see also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57 (2009) (categorizing a 
product as unreasonably dangerous if a product may cause damage and an adequate 
warning is not provided).  In both states, the manufacturer has the duty to warn. See
Marks v. OHMEDA, Inc., 871 So. 2d 1148, 1155 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Gray v. Badger
Mining Corp., 676 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Minn. 2004). 



















   
   
 
 







   
 
of metoclopramide were liable for their damages because the manufacturers 
of the generic drug knew or should have known of the high risk of the
condition’s occurrence and knew or should have known that their labels 
were inadequate to warn of that risk.58  The Supreme Court noted that
the parties did not dispute the fact that if plaintiffs’ allegations were true, 
“state law required the Manufacturers to use a different, safer label.”59 
The manufacturers defended by arguing that federal statutes and FDA 
regulations required them to use the same labels as their brand-name 
equivalents, meaning that it was impossible for the manufacturers to
simultaneously comply with federal law and any state tort law duty
requiring the strengthening of their labels—therefore, they could not be 
held liable.60  At issue was “whether, and to what extent, generic
manufacturers may change their labels after initial FDA approval.”61 
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court ruled that generic
manufacturers were not liable because in accordance with the FDA’s
interpretation of its regulations, the generic manufacturers had only the
power to maintain their drug labels as the same as their brand-name
equivalents, and thus could not change their labels to make them in
accordance with state law without violating federal law.62 In determining 
whether the manufacturers could have taken steps to warn consumers,
namely, to have tried the FDA’s change-being-effected (CBE) process or
to have sent “Dear Doctor” letters, the Court stated: 
The FDA, however, tells us that it interprets its regulations to require that the
warning labels of a brand-name drug and its generic copy must always be the
same . . . .  The FDA’s views are “controlling unless plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation[s]” . . . .
. . . .
We defer to the FDA’s interpretation of its CBE and generic labeling 
regulations.  Although Mensing and Demahy offer other ways to interpret the 
58. Actavis, 593 F.3d at 430; Wyeth, 588 F.3d at 605. 
59. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
60. Actavis, 593 F.3d at 430; Wyeth, 588 F.3d at 605.  Originally, federal law 
required that any manufacturer of drugs applying for FDA approval, both brand and 
generic, prove that its drug was safe and effective and that the proposed label was 
accurate and adequate.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A), (d) (2000) (current version at 
21 U.S.C. § 355 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011)); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 567 (2009). 
However, since Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, the law has permitted generic drug manufacturers to gain 
approval by showing that the generic drug is equivalent to a brand-name drug that was 
already FDA approved.  See Pub. L. No. 98-417, §§ 101–103, 98 Stat. 1585, 1585–97
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006)).  The generic manufacturer only
needs to show that the safety and efficacy of its proposed labeling “is the same as the 
labeling approved for the [brand-name] drug.”  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(v); see also id.
§ 355(j)(4)(G).
61. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2574. 
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regulations . . . we do not find the agency’s interpretation “plainly erroneous or 
inconsistent with the regulation.” . . .
. . . .
As with the CBE regulation, we defer to the FDA. . . .  Accordingly, we
conclude that federal law did not permit the Manufactures to issue additional 
warnings through Dear Doctor letters.63 
Because the Court, following the FDA’s interpretation, found that 
there were no means by which manufacturers could have improved their 
warning labels without violating federal law, it held that there was federal
implied preemption based on impossibility: “It was not lawful under 
federal law for the Manufacturers to do what state law required of them.”64 
Furthermore, relying again on the FDA’s interpretation,65 the Court
reasoned that federal law likely “required the Manufacturers to ask for
FDA assistance in convincing the brand-name manufacturer to adopt a 
stronger label, so that all corresponding generic drug manufacturers could
do so as well.”66  The Court noted that “even if [the manufacturers] had
fulfilled their federal duty to ask for FDA assistance, they would not
have satisfied the requirements of state law.”67 
The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the manufacturers
failed to show impossibility based on the fact that the manufacturers did 
not attempt to seek a change with the FDA, which if the FDA approved, 
would have allowed them improve their label in satisfaction of state law 
while still satisfying federal law.68  The Court held that “[t]he question
for ‘impossibility’ is whether the private party could independently do
under federal law what state law requires of it”69 because to hold otherwise
“would render conflict pre-emption largely meaningless”70 and because 
the Supremacy Clause is a non obstante provision, meaning that the 
federal law in the case “impliedly repeal[ed the] conflicting state law” at
63. Id. at 2574–76 (citations omitted). 
64. Id. at 2577. 
65. The Court noted that “[a]ccording to the FDA, the Manufacturers could have
proposed—indeed, were required to propose—stronger warning labels to the agency if 
they believed such warnings were needed.”  Id. at 2576.  The Court did not, however, 
resolve whether such a duty did in fact exist because the Court determined that
preemption was dispositive. Id.
66. Id. at 2577. 
67. Id. at 2577–78. 
68. Id. at 2578–79. 
























issue.71  In so reasoning, the Court essentially determined that impossibility
occurs when approval by the FDA is a prerequisite to changing a drug’s
label.72 
B.  PLIVA Was Wrongly Decided; Its Flawed and 
Illogical Reasoning
As summarized above, the PLIVA decision involved a legal analysis of 
the preemption doctrine, essentially turning on whether there was implied 
preemption based on impossibility because there was clearly no express 
preemption.73  However, in this analysis, the Court gave great deference
to the FDA’s opinion, and as a result left out much of the Court’s own 
interpretational analysis on whether there were any means available for
manufacturers to make label changes.74  The Court did, however, discuss 
several other theories in support of its impossibility holding—it argued 
against the plaintiffs’ impossibility theory, considered the argument of 
reductio ad absurdum, discussed the potential to render the impossibility 
doctrine meaningless, and declared the Supremacy Clause to be a non
obstante provision, thereby supporting federal preemption.75 
However, upon a closer look at the Court’s analysis of each of these 
theories, it is evident that the analysis is both flawed and illogical.  This 
subpart will discuss each of the majority’s arguments to show how they
fail, and Part V will later discuss the possible reasons for why the Court 
decided PLIVA the way it did. 
1. There Was No Express Preemption 
The majority and the dissent agreed on one thing—there was no express 
preemption of state law.76  Two longstanding principles of preemption
analysis support their conclusion.  First, “the purpose of Congress is the 
ultimate touchstone in every pre-emption case,”77 and second, 
71. Id. at 2580.  The Court determined for the first time in PLIVA that the 
Supremacy Clause is to be read as a non obstante provision.  See infra Part III.B.3.
72. The Court appeared to rely on the distinction in federal law that requires
generic manufacturers to get prior approval from the FDA, whereas the brand-name
manufacturers do not need the same prior approval.  See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2580–81
(citing Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 572–73). 
73. See supra Part III.A. 
74. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2580–81. 
75. Id. at 2577–80. 
76. Id. at 2577 n.5.  The majority noted “[t]he Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
contain no provision expressly pre-empting state tort claims.  Nor do they contain any 
saving clause to expressly preserve state tort claims.”  Id. (citations omitted).
77. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Medtronic, 
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“[I]n all pre-emption cases, . . . particularly in those in which Congress has 
‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ . . . ‘[the 
analysis begins with] the assumption that the historic police powers of the
States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress.’”78 
States have traditionally regulated the fields of health and safety.79 
Within both of these fields, the states have created extensive systems for
tort litigation against drug manufacturers.80  And not once has Congress 
expressly preempted state law tort actions against either brand or generic-
prescription drug manufacturers despite Congress’s “certain awareness 
of the prevalence of state tort litigation” against these manufacturers.81 
In fact, when Congress amended the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) in 1962, it specifically ensured the preservation of state
law.82  The amendments state: 
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any provision of State law 
which would be valid in the absence of such amendments unless there is a
direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such provision of 
State law.83 
Logically, it would follow then that Congress amended the FDCA with 
the intention of retaining state tort remedies as a complement to federal
consumer protection.84  Moreover, given the fact that Congress did not
make any express preemption for generic prescription drugs in the 
Hatch-Waxman Amendments when it had made express preemption for 
medical devices in 1976, it is more likely that Congress did not intend 
express preemption for generics.85  Thus it is clear that Congress did not
78. Id. (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Lohr, 518 U.S. at 485). 
79. See id. at 566. 
80. The state laws at issue in PLIVA are a good example of such regulation.  131 S. 
Ct. at 2573. 
81. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 575. 
82. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat.
781, 793 (1962); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567. 
83. FDCA § 202. 
84. Both the Constitution and its principles support this conclusion; maintaining
the states’ traditional role in providing for the safety and health of their inhabitants when 
there is no direct conflict between state and federal law is a touchstone of preemption
analysis. See, e.g., Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 565 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S.
470, 485 (1996)).
85. Compare Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, § 521, 90 
Stat. 539, 574 (clearly stating that the new federal law respecting medical devices 






















intend and clearly did not act with any clear and manifest purpose that 
the federal law on safety labeling preempt state law on ensuring drug 
safety and effectiveness. 
2. There Really Was No Implied Preemption 
There also was no implied preemption based on impossibility.  Given
the relevant law and facts in PLIVA, it is difficult to see how the
majority found otherwise.  First, implied preemption of state law based
on the defense of impossibility “is a demanding defense,”86 and the
defendant seeking to set aside the state law on impossibility grounds bears 
this heavy burden.87  Second, impossibility only occurs when federal and 
state law conflict—when “it is impossible for a private party to comply
with both state and federal law.”88  In order to show a conflict, the
defendant must show that “compliance with both federal and state [law] 
is a physical impossibility.”89  Showing “[t]he existence of a hypothetical or
potential conflict is insufficient.”90  As such, the showing of a possibility
that impossibility exists does not meet the defendant’s burden. 
However, the defendants in PLIVA only demonstrated “a hypothetical
or potential conflict.”91  The defendant manufacturers argued, and the Court 
agreed, that because federal law prohibited them from changing their 
labels unilaterally, it was impossible for them to provide additional 
warnings.92  However, the manufacturers “could have asked the FDA to 
initiate a label change” and “[i]f the FDA agreed that a label change was 
required, it could have asked, and indeed pressured, the brand-name
manufacturer to change its label, triggering a corresponding change to
the Manufacturers’ generic labels.”93  If the manufacturers had initiated 
[prescription drugs] issue . . . is powerful evidence that [it] did not intend FDA oversight 
to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”).
86. Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573. 
87. See id.; see also Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 255 (1984). 
88. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000).  There is 
also a conflict when state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”  Id. at 373 (quoting Hines v.
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted).  However, only
the former mode of conflict was at issue in PLIVA.  PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 
2567, 2577–78 (2011). 
89. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43 (1963); see 
Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 573 (concluding that Wyeth failed to demonstrate this standard).
90. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982); see also Gade v. 
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 110 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (quoting Rice, 458 U.S. at 659). 
91. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2587 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Rice, 458 U.S. 
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such FDA action, it would have been possible then for them to comply
with both federal and state law.  Thus, without even trying to comply
with state law by seeking help from the FDA, it is difficult to see how it 
was impossible for the generic manufacturers to comply with both federal 
and state law.  This situation only gave rise to a potential conflict, as an
actual conflict would only arise if the FDA denied the manufacturers’ 
request for FDA action.  Thus in reality, the manufacturers were not faced 
with the impossibility required by law—physical impossibility.
Yet, in a cursory fashion and with resort to inventive and novel 
theories, the majority found otherwise.94 The Court appeared to invent a
new preemption rule based on Wyeth v. Levine: “The question for
‘impossibility’ is whether the private party could independently do under 
federal law what state law requires of it.”95  Essentially, the Court 
conditioned the impossibility analysis in PLIVA on whether a defendant 
could independently make a label change.  The majority relied primarily
on the differentiation between the so-called unilateral power that a 
brand-name manufacturer has to change its labels, as noted in Wyeth, 
and the lack of a similar power for generic manufacturers. 96  The majority
reasoned that because generic manufacturers cannot change their labels
of their own accord, unlike name-brand manufacturers, it was impossible 
for them to independently comply with both federal and state law.97 
However, no Supreme Court precedent ever supported any such rule. 
In fact, as the dissent discussed, even if Wyeth were to be considered as 
support for this rule, Wyeth did not hold that “it is impossible to comply
with both federal and state law whenever federal agency approval is 
required.”98  On the contrary, the Wyeth decision recognized that although 
prior approval by the FDA of label changes by brand-name manufacturers 
is not necessary,99 the changes are still subject to FDA approval.100 
Furthermore,
94. Id. at 2577–78 (majority opinion). 
95. Id. at 2579 (emphasis added) (citing Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 573 
(2009)). 
96. Id. at 2589–90 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. at 2577–78 (majority opinion). 
98. Id. at 2589 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
99. See id. at 2574 (majority opinion); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 570–71; 21 C.F.R. 
§ 314.70(c)(6) (2011).
100. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2588 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 
568–71; 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6).  As the dissent in PLIVA noted: 
Just like the brand-name manufacturer in Wyeth, the Manufacturers had





















   
even if Wyeth could be characterized as turning on the fact that the brand-name
manufacturer could change its label unilaterally, the possibility of unilateral 
action was, at most, a sufficient condition for rejecting the impossibility
defense in that case. Wyeth did not hold that unilateral action is a necessary
condition in every case.101 
The majority failed to address these facts.102  As such, in reality, the power
of brand-name drug manufacturers to change their labels is not as
independent as the majority makes it out to be—their power is akin to 
the power vested in generic drug manufacturers, who must also get
approval from the FDA.  Being so, the unilateral power of brand-name 
drugs to act without prior approval is not a compelling factor in the
preemption analysis.  Thus, the majority’s reasoning and finding of 
impossibility based on the grounds that brand-name manufacturers can 
independently change their labels is flawed.  As in Wyeth, where FDA 
acceptance was the final step in changing label warnings for brand-name
drug manufacturers, unless the generic manufacturers “show that the 
FDA would not have approved a proposed label change,”103 there is no 
impossibility.104  This reasoning comports with the notion of physical 
impossibility⎯actual rejection of the proposed change by the FDA would
physically prevent generic manufacturers from complying with state law. 
In sum, the majority’s reasoning here fails; because the Court created
a rule that is itself flawed, illogical, and without support, there really is 
no adequate basis for the majority’s finding of implied preemption under 
the traditional impossibility analysis. 
3. And of the Court’s Other Theories, None Offer 
Strong Support 
Most likely due to the fact that the Court recognized its impossibility
theory for preemption was flawed, it turned to several other theories to 
support its decision, including that reductio ad absurdum for the 
argument that the generic manufacturers could ask the FDA to initiate 
change, that deciding otherwise would make the impossibility analysis 
duty to warn.  Federal law thus “accommodated” the Manufacturers’ state-law 
duties.  It was not necessarily impossible for the Manufacturers to comply with
both federal and state law because, had they approached the FDA, the FDA 
may well have agreed that a label change was necessary. 
131 S. Ct. at 2588 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
101. Id. at 2589–90. 
102. Id. at 2590. 
103. Id. at 2588. 
104. The dissent notes that impossibility could arise under these facts “[i]f a
generic-manufacturer defendant proposed a label change to the FDA but the FDA 
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illusory, and that the Supremacy Clause is a non obstante provision.105 
However, each of these theories is as equally flawed as the majority’s
main analysis and offers no strong support for PLIVA. 
First, the majority turned to a reductio ad absurdum argument, 
arguing that the plaintiffs’ premise that there was no conflict because the
manufacturers could seek approval from the FDA was invalid because
this conclusion would be akin to finding no conflict because the FDA
could rewrite its legislation or Congress might amend the Hatch-Waxman 
Amendments—both of which the majority found to be absurd.106 
However, as the dissent notes, the majority’s reasoning on reductio ad
absurdum grounds is incorrect.107  As Justice Sotomayor put it, “[c]onflict
analysis necessarily turns on existing law,”108 and as such, the use of 
reductio ad absurdum with examples of nonexisting law is flawed.  “It 
thus would be ridiculous to conclude that federal and state law do not 
conflict on the ground that the defendant could have asked a federal 
agency or Congress to change the law.”109  As such, the majority’s use of 
reductio ad absurdum to support its analysis is illogical and offers the 
decision no valid support.
Second, the majority resorted to arguing that any other holding aside 
from finding implied preemption would make the doctrine of conflict
preemption “illusory” and “meaningless.”110  However, had the Court
ruled that there was no implied preemption in the case, there could still 
be a finding of preemption based on impossibility for future cases.  For
instance, if the generic manufacturers were to ask the FDA to initiate a 
change in the brand-name—and thus generic—labels and the FDA were 
to refuse to take action, it would be impossible to comply with federal
and state labeling laws.  Therefore, had the Court held that there was no
implied preemption in PLIVA, such a holding would not render the 
doctrine of conflict preemption either “illusory” or “meaningless.”
Furthermore, conflict preemption can also be found even when no
impossibility is found when state law “stands as an obstacle to the
105. See id. at 2577–80 (majority opinion). 
106. Id. at 2579. 
107. Id. at 2590 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“None of the rationales that [the
majority] offers, however, makes any sense.”). 
108. Id.
109. Id.
































accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress.”111  The majority’s analysis failed to consider these options. 
And finally, the PLIVA Court then determined that the Framers
intended that the Supremacy Clause be a non obstante provision, departing
from decades of precedent to find that generic drug manufacturers would
be shielded from liability on the grounds of preemption.112  In so holding, 
the majority “read[] the Supremacy Clause to operate as a provision 
instructing courts ‘not to apply the general presumption against implied 
repeals’” of state law,113 which no other Court had done before.  For
years, Supreme Court jurisprudence maintained that the police powers of
the states were inviolable, and only when Congress acts with “the clear
and manifest purpose” of superseding state law can it be considered
superseded.114 This doctrine, focusing on Congress’s purpose, ensures
that the courts find the true purpose of Congress in preemption cases.115 
To discern Congress’s true purpose, the court must primarily look to
the language of the pre-emption statute and the “statutory framework” 
surrounding it.  Also relevant . . . is the “structure and purpose of the statute as 
a whole,” . . . as revealed not only in the text, but through the reviewing court’s
reasoned understanding of the way in which Congress intended the statute and
its surrounding regulatory scheme to affect business, consumers, and the
law.116 
However, in PLIVA, the majority avoided assessing the true purpose of 
Congress, presumably because had it done so, the Court could have
 111. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see,
e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the state tort law for which the petitioners argued was preempted because it 
was inconsistent with Congress’s objective); Barnett Bank of Marion Cnty., N. A. v. 
Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (finding impossibility where a state ban on certain
banking activities stood as an obstacle to the purpose of a federal statute); Hines, 312 
U.S. at 67 (determining whether Pennsylvania state law was a direct obstacle that 
impeded Congress’s intent for the conflicting federal law). 
112. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2580. 
113. Id. at 2591 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
114. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Gade v.
Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) (adopting same language for preemption). 
Moreover, this presumption is applied in all cases where Congress has expressly or 
impliedly dealt with preemption. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566 n.3 (2009). 
115. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 
(1963) (“The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone [in every preemption 
case].”); see also Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting same
language); Gade, 505 U.S. at 96 (quoting same); Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S.
497, 504 (1978) (quoting same).
116. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 486 (1996) (citations omitted) (quoting
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found no way to justify its holding.  For instance, it clearly failed to 
consider how Congress intended the law to affect business, consumers,
and the law, most likely because Congress would have never intended 
that the law make consumers’ ability to exercise their right to seek
justice for drug-related harm contingent on whether they were prescribed
generic or brand-name drugs.  Thus, rather than engaging in the proper 
clear and manifest purpose analysis to find the real purpose of Congress, 
the Court instead held that the “courts [are] to ‘look no further than the 
ordinary meaning of federal law.’”117 
The Court’s unprecedented change of law on preemption assessment 
had no basis in prior law.  The Court should have conducted the proper clear 
and manifest purpose analysis and as such, the decision is faulty.
Moreover, because the use of the non obstante argument under the law 
and facts of PLIVA really only appears to be a means for the Court to 
justify its position on preemption, there is no valid basis for supporting 
the majority’s finding of preemption on these grounds. 
Upon a deeper analysis of the majority’s opinion, it is clear each of its 
arguments is flawed or illogical.  The ruling calls into question whether 
the Court may have based its decision not on the law but rather on its 
ideological underpinnings.  In likely so doing, the Court harmed consumers 
in a great way⎯the Court took away their right to seek redress against 
generic manufacturers for injuries caused as a result of their drugs.  Parts
IV and V will cover this discussion further. 
IV. PLIVA’S EFFECT: DEVASTATION FOR CONSUMERS BUT A 
BIG WIN FOR BIG PHARMA
The majority’s “pre-emption analysis strips generic-drug consumers of 
compensation when they are injured by inadequate warnings.”118  In one
brief opinion, the Court essentially determined that “Congress silently
immunized generic manufacturers from all failure-to-warn claims.”119  In 
so doing, the Court ignored the Supreme Court’s general historical 
reluctance to “infer congressional intent to effect such a sweeping
change in traditional state-law remedies.”120  Now, after PLIVA, “a drug 
consumer’s right to compensation for inadequate warnings . . . turns on
117. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct at 2591 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 























    
  
       
 
the happenstance of whether her pharmacist filled her prescription with a 
brand-name drug or a generic.”121  Moreover, as the dissent noted: 
In some States, pharmacists must dispense generic drugs absent instruction to
the contrary from a consumer’s physician.  Even when consumers can request
brand-name drugs, the price of the brand-name drug or the consumers’ 
insurance plans may make it impossible to do so.  As a result, in many cases, 
consumers will have no ability to preserve their state-law right to recover for
injuries caused by inadequate warnings.122 
In an age when name-brand drugs that have a generic equivalent are 
filled by the generic 90% of the time,123 the PLIVA decision has created 
devastating consequences for the vast majority of prescription drug 
consumers. 
Patients who suffer injuries caused by prescription drugs can be left 
with physical impairment.124  Some patients may be left unable to work
to support their families.  They may be burdened with medical expenses 
such as doctor visits, treatments, surgery, counseling, and further 
medications.  For example, in one recent case, the child of an Iraq war 
soldier was born with severe birth defects because his mother was
prescribed medication to alleviate the stress she suffered while her
husband was away at war.  The child required extensive surgery, causing 
extreme hardship for the child and the family.  However, because the 
medication received was generic, the family is now prohibited from 
pursuing a claim under state law against the manufacturer for its failure 
to warn of the risk of a possible birth defect.125  The results of PLIVA are
unjust for those Americans who may be or have already been harmed by 
the side effects of generic prescription drugs. 
Furthermore, PLIVA “eliminates the traditional state-law incentives
for generic manufacturers to monitor and disclose safety risks” due to 
the market forces in the pharmaceutical industry driving monitoring and 
disclosing actors out of the market.126  Generally, when a generic drug
and its brand-name equivalent are on the market concurrently, the brand-
name drug manufacturer has the incentive to investigate and find safety
risks for both the brand-name and generic drug.127  However, market 
analyses show that once a generic drug enters the market, the 
121. Id.
122. Id.
 123. EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 4, at 3–4 (citing SHEPPARD, 
supra note 4, at 3). 
124. For example, the plaintiffs in PLIVA developed tardive dyskinesia, a severe
neurological disorder.  131 S. Ct. at 2572–73. 
125. For confidentiality purposes, the parties involved in this case will not be
identified.
126. Id. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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pharmaceutical manufacturer of the brand-name drug equivalent will
often take its product off the market.128  As a result of the PLIVA decision,
no party will be liable for inadequate warning claims, as there will be no 
brand-name manufacturers on the market and generic manufacturers,
free from liability, have no incentive—or even legal authority—to monitor 
and disclose newfound risks.129  Because the brand-name manufacturers
often leave the market, their generic drug equivalents that remain on the
market lack the additional drug safety check originally provided by the 
now absent brand-name drug manufacturers.130 
Although the PLIVA decision deals a devastating blow to consumers, 
it marks a huge victory for the pharmaceutical industry.  Now, generic-
pharmaceutical corporations are insulated from litigation regarding and 
liability for state law failure-to-warn claims.  Litigating these cases can
cost multiple billions per year.  For instance, from 2009 to 2010, eight 
drug safety cases regarding selling drugs with possible side effects were
settled for approximately $8.6 billion.131  AstraZeneca announced in
August 2010 that it had spent approximately $656 million to defend 
itself in numerous cases involving the drug Seroquel alone.132  In recent 
years, the growth of class action suits by groups claiming harm from 
nondisclosure of full drug safety information has cost pharmaceutical 
companies millions to settle, plus revenue loss due to product recalls.133 
128. Id. at 2593. 
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. Rising Costs of Litigation in Pharmaceuticals Industry, KPMG ISSUES 
MONITOR, June 2011, at 1, 3, available at http://www.kpmg.com/CH/en/Library/Articles-
Publications/Documents/Sectors/pub_20110601_issues-monitor-_EN.pdf.  Eight cases
regarding selling drugs for unapproved uses were settled for $4.9 billion. Id.  These 
figures do not even include the settlement costs to Big Pharma for government suits.  In
fact: 
Over the past 20 years, more than 165 cases of civil and criminal actions by
federal and state governments were settled in the US by pharmaceutical 
companies, with total penalties of approximately US[ ]$19.8 billion.  Of those, 
about 73 percent of the settlements and 75 percent of the penalties were 
awarded from 2006–10.  Moreover, more than half of these penalties were imposed
on four leading companies⎯GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Pfizer, Eli Lilly and 
Schering-Plough (which was later acquired by Merck). 
Id. at 4 (citing SAMMY ALMASHAT ET AL., PUB. CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GRP., RAPIDLY 
INCREASING CRIMINAL AND CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES AGAINST THE PHARMACEUTICAL 
INDUSTRY: 1991 TO 2010, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/
rapidlyincreasingcriminalandcivilpenalties.pdf). 
132. Id. at 6. 




















   
 
 
    
  
    
 
        
          
     
 
 
For instance, in December 2009, GlaxoSmithKline paid $1 billion to
settle a class action suit for its drug Paxil, which caused birth defects 
during pregnancy, and more than 600 other Paxil cases are pending.134 
In December 2007, Merck agreed to settle by paying $4.85 billion to 
plaintiffs claiming that its drug Vioxx caused heart attacks and strokes.135 
Now, after PLIVA, manufacturers like GlaxoSmithKline and Merck will 
no longer be liable under state law for the harm caused to American
consumers as a result of their generic drugs’ inadequate warnings. 
These enormously profitable corporations,136 which are poised to expand 
in the upcoming decade,137 certainly came out on top when the
Court decided PLIVA.  This is no surprise.  For years big business in the
pharmaceutical and medical industry has fought to control business 
losses and liability exposure through both the courts and legislation.  In 
1975, in response to the growing trend of malpractice claims and large 
jury awards, the California legislature passed the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA),138 essentially gutting the amount a
patient can receive in a malpractice suit and reducing severely what a
lawyer can receive in bringing such claims.139  Similarly, in a 2008 
decision favorable to medical device manufacturers, the Supreme Court 
held that certain state law claims against medical device manufacturers
were expressly preempted by the 1976 Medical Device Amendments.140 
As recently as February 2011, the Supreme Court ruled in Bruesewitz v.
Wyeth LLC on preemption grounds that pharmaceutical companies are 
134. Id. (citing Paxil Lawsuit Settlements Amount to $1 Billion So Far, PARKER 
WAICHMAN LLP (Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.yourlawyer.com/articles/title/paxil-lawsuit- 
settlements-amount-to-1-billion-so-far).
135. Id. (citing David Voreacos & Jef Feeley, Merck Wins Judge’s Ruling Against 
Vioxx Class Action (Update 1), BLOOMBERG (Mar. 17, 2009, 5:12 PM), http://www. 
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=ac3chipK8C7o&refer=home). 
136. See supra Part II. 
137. See supra Part II.  In fact, one report noted in 2006 that the drug maker Wyeth
had “set aside a reserve of $21 billion to deal with litigation related to the obesity
medication Fen-Phen.  Merck’s exposure to Vioxx lawsuits may total as much as $50
billion . . . .” Litigation Raising Health Care Cost, Study Says, HEARTLANDER MAG. 
(Jan. 1, 2006), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2006/01/01/litigation-raising-
health-care-costs-study-says (citing CTR. FOR LEGAL POLICY, MANHATTAN INST., TRIAL 
LAWYERS, INC.: HEALTH CARE (2005), available at http://www.triallawyersinc.com/ 
healthcare/hc01.html).
 138. See Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) of 1975, 1975 Cal. 
Stat. 3949 (codified as amended at at CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West 2003); CAL. 
CIV. CODE §§ 3333.1–.2 (West 1997); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 667.7 (West 2009)).
139. See MICRA History, CALIFORNIANS ALLIED FOR PATIENT PROTECTION, http://
www.micra.org/about-micra/micra-history.html (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).  Specifically, 
MICRA limited attorney contingency fees on a sliding scale and placed a $250,000 limit 
on noneconomic damages.  Id.
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protected by the 1986 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act141 from
lawsuits by parents alleging harm to their children as a result of a design
defect in vaccines.142  This decision marked a giant “victory for vaccine
makers such as Wyeth and GlaxoSmithKline,”143 but a huge loss for
vaccine consumers, namely children who suffer serious side effects from 
vaccines.  For instance, as a result of the Supreme Court’s holding, the 
victim in the case, Hannah Bruesewitz, who began to have seizures after
receiving the third of five scheduled doses of Wyeth’s Tri-Immunol
diptheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccine as an infant, is prevented from suing 
the manufacturers for causing her harm and will receive no compensation 
for her injuries or the costs of her treatment.144 Today, given the historically 
favorable jurisprudence towards the medical and pharmaceutical industry,
it is no surprise that the PLIVA decision came out on the side of
pharmaceutical manufacturers.145 
In connection with this sweeping victory for the pharmaceutical
industry, on the micro level, the generic-pharmaceutical defendants in
the case themselves received a staggering financial win.146  For example, 
Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd., one of the main defendants in
PLIVA, received a legal victory worth approximately $500 million to the 
company.147  Had the decision gone the other way, Teva would have had
141. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2006). 
142. Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 131 S. Ct. 1068, 1082 (2011). 
 143. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Rules Vaccine Makers Protected from Lawsuits, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2011, 10:46 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/  
content/article/2011/02/22/AR2011022206008.html. 
144. See Bruesewitz, 131 S. Ct. at 1074–75, 1082.  Also note that the vaccine’s 
manufacturer, now owned by Pfizer, has since taken the drug at issue off the market. 
Barnes, supra note 143.  Furthermore, any other vaccine claims, aside from those in
Bruesewitz—because they can no longer be brought—must go through the Act’s
administrative court before a tort case can be filed, making it far more difficult for
plaintiffs to get adequate representation and awards.  See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-11(a)(1), 
-12(d)(3), -12(e), -12(g), -21(a).  This special tribunal is commonly called the “Vaccine
Court.”  Barnes, supra note 143. 
145. See infra Part V (looking into how the Court and government have been
influenced by Big Pharma in decisionmaking).  In fact, “Actavis Inc. CEO Doug Boothe 
called the decision ‘an important and necessary step by the Supreme Court to clarify the 
proper interpretation of the regulations governing pharmaceutical labeling.’”  Press 
Release, Actavis Inc., Actavis Hails US Supreme Court Decision in Labeling Cases (June
23, 2011), available at http://www.actavis.us/en/news/Actavis_hails_Court_ Decision.htm. 
146. The suit, filed against Actavis and PLIVA, marked a victory for the 
pharmaceutical giants Teva, Mylan Inc. unit UDL Laboratories, and Actavis.  Yael 






   






















   
  
   
   
to pay out this sum to the plaintiffs.  Teva was also saved from the stigma
attached to tort liability, which would have had serious ramifications for its
reputation in existing and future markets—a major concern as Teva is
gearing up to enter emerging markets abroad.148 
Based on these facts, it is clear that PLIVA was a big win for Big
Pharma, but a huge loss for consumers.  Given the weak legal basis for 
PLIVA’s outcome,149 this result brings up the question of what role the
pharmaceutical industry plays in shaping public policy and even judicial
decisions. 
V. THE REAL MOTIVATION BEHIND PLIVA
A. The Private Sector: Big Pharma Has Big Power 
In the past two decades, as the pharmaceutical industry’s profits have
skyrocketed, so has its political clout.  From 1998 to 2012, the
pharmaceutical industry was ranked number one as the top lobbying 
spender in the United States, spending more than $2 billion over the
course of fourteen years.150 From 1998 to 2005, the pharmaceutical and
health products industry spent in excess of $800 million in federal
lobbying and campaign donations at both the federal and state levels.151 
During this period, the pharmaceutical lobbying operation, the largest 
lobbying operation in America, was reported to have spent more than
$675 million, more than any other industry.152  In the most recent years it 
has maintained its first place position, spending $272.8 million in 
2009,153 $245.3 million in 2010,154 $241.5 million in 2011,155 and $124.4 
million in 2012 as of September.156  In 2009, “the pharmaceutical and
health products industry’s federal lobbying expenditures not only
outpaced all other business industries and special interest areas . . . , but 
148. See supra notes 36–40 and accompanying text. 
149. See supra Part III.B. 
150. Lobbying Top Industries: 1998–2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets. 
org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).
151. M. Asif Ismail, Drug Lobby Second to None, CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY 
(July 7, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://projects.publicintegrity.org/rx/report.aspx?aid=723. 
152. Id.
153. Lobbying Top Industries: 2009, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/top.php?showYear=2009&indexType=i (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
154. Lobbying Top Industries: 2010, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/top.php?showYear=2010&indexType=i (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
155. Lobbying Top Industries: 2011, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/top.php?showYear=2011&indexType=i (last visited Sept. 9, 2012). 
156. Lobbying Top Industries: 2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/
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[also stood] as the greatest amount ever spent on lobbying efforts by a
single industry for one year.”157 
By 2005, pharmaceutical manufacturers had hired approximately “3,000 
lobbyists, more than a third of them former federal officials, to advance 
their interests before the House, the Senate, the FDA, the Department of 
Health and Human Services, and other executive branch offices.”158  In
2004, of the 1,291 lobbyists listed as representing pharmaceutical
corporations, 52% were former federal officials.159  “The top 20 drug
corporations and the industry’s two trade groups, PhRMA and the 
Biotechnology Industry Organization, . . . disclosed lobbying on more 
than 1,600 bills between 1998 and 2004.”160 These fleets of pharmaceutical
lobbyists largely target Congress and the FDA.161  Additionally, as of
2005, the industry—notorious for “employing former [government]
officials to lobby on bills sponsored by their ex-bosses”—ensured that
“[a] third of all [its] lobbyists . . . [were] former federal government 
employees, including more than 15 former Senators and more than 60
former members of the U.S. House of Representatives.”162 
As for political contributions, from 2000 to 2005, the top drug corporations and
their employees and PhRMA gave more than $10 million to 527 organizations,
tax-exempt political committees which operate in the grey area between federal
and state campaign finance laws. 
Nearly $87 million of the contributions went to federal politicians in campaign 
donations, with almost 69 percent going to Republican candidates.163 
The pharmaceutical industry’s top recipients of campaign money included 
former President George W. Bush, who received in excess of $1.5 
 157. Communications, Federal Lobbying Climbs in 2009 as Lawmakers Execute 
Aggressive Congressional Agenda, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Feb. 12, 2010, 10:30 AM), http:// 
www.opensecrets.org/news/2010/02/federal-lobbying-soars-in-2009.html#. 
 158. Ismail, supra note 151. 
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (“In 2003 alone, the industry spent nearly $116 million lobbying the
government.  That was the year that Congress passed, and President George W. Bush
signed, the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, which created a taxpayer-funded
prescription drug benefit for senior citizens.”).  Additionally, lobbying Congress has paid 
off with “a series of favorable laws [for Big Pharma] on Capitol Hill” being passed.  Id.












      
  
  
   
  
  
   
 
 






   














million,164 and members of Congress who sit on committees with
jurisdiction over pharmaceutical issues.165  In total, for the 2007 to 2010 
election cycles, pharmaceutical industry contributions were reported to
be approximately $4.3 million.166 
Through its lobbying and campaign donation efforts, the pharmaceutical
industry has great influence on politics via its associations with Capitol 
Hill, federal administrative bodies, and the Presidents it supports.  For 
example, Congress’s enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Amendments,
promoting the use of generic drugs in the first place, was a big boost to 
164. Id.; see also PUB. CAMPAIGN ACTION FUND, BUYING A LAW: BIG PHARMA’S BIG 
MONEY AND THE BUSH MEDICARE PLAN 2 (2004) available at http://www.paxilprogress.org/ 
pdf/PCAF-Buying_Law.pdf  (“President Bush maintains very close personal and political
relationships with the industry and with [its] major corporations . . . .  At least seven 
‘Pioneers’ or ‘Rangers’—well-connected wealthy individuals who pledged to raise $100,000
or $200,000, respectively, for Bush’s campaigns—come from the pharmaceutical 
industry.”).  One clinical psychologist, in a study on the Bush-Lilly relationship, recited: 
If Americans want to take on Lilly, they might want to do it during a time 
when the Bush family is out of power.  Sidney Taurel, former Lilly CEO and
George W. Bush appointee to the Homeland Security Advisory Council, is not
the only Bush family-Lilly connection.  George Herbert Walker Bush once sat
on the Eli Lilly board of directors, as did Bush family crony Ken Lay, the 
Enron chief convicted of fraud before his death.  Mitch Daniels, George W. 
Bush’s first-term Director of Management and Budget, had actually been a 
Lilly vice president, and in 1991 he had co-chaired a Bush-Quayle fundraiser
that collected $600,000.  This is the same Mitch Daniels who is now governor
of Indiana, Lilly’s home state.
Bruce E. Levine, Eli Lilly and the Case for the Corporate Death Penalty, ALLIANCE FOR 
HUM. RES. PROTECTION (Mar. 8, 2009), http://www.ahrp.org/cms/content/view/534/109/ 
[hereinafter Levine I]; see also Bruce Levine, Big Pharma: Eli Lilly, Zyprexa, & the 
Bush Family, Z MAG. (May 2004), http://psychrights.org/articles/LevineLillyandBush.htm 
[hereinafter Levine II] (providing further details on the relationship between the Bush
family and Eli Lilly).  Also note that former President Bush was behind the congressional
legislation insulating manufacturers of vaccines from liability:
[S]oon after George W. Bush signed the Homeland Security Act, New York
Times columnist Bob Herbert discovered that “[b]uried in this massive bill, 
snuck into it in the dark of night by persons unknown . . . was a provision 
that—incredibly—will protect Eli Lilly and a few other big pharmaceutical 
outfits from lawsuits by parents who believe their children were harmed by
thimerosal.”
Levine I, supra (quoting Bob Herbert, Whose Hands Are Dirty?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 25, 
2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/25/opinion/whose-hands-are-dirty.html?src=pm). 
 165. Ismail, supra note 151. 
166. Curious Clusters of Cash: Major Lobbyist-Client Connections Among Health
Care Interests, 2007-2009, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/lm_
health.php?type=C (last visited Sept. 9, 2012).  This number does not account for the 
additional contributions from the clients of the pharmaceutical companies.
Additionally, “[m]embers of Congress and their aides accepted more than $600,000 in 
free travel from pharmaceutical interests during a 5½-year period [in the early 2000s] in 
which drug company profits climbed, in part due to federal legislation favorable to the
industry.”  Robert Brodsky, Drug Makers’ Dime Funds Congressional Travel, CENTER 
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the generic industry.167 The latest example of the industry’s influence is 
the PLIVA decision itself.168  The pharmaceutical industry’s longtime
lobbying presence influenced the case, as the Court relied on the
interpretation of the FDA, having long been lobbied by the industry.169 
Thus, with billions of dollars at stake, the pharmaceutical industry puts
ample money into lobbying and campaign efforts to exact influence on
its areas of interest, including liability, via Congress, the President, and 
the FDA, ensuring favorable legislation, regulation, and even judicial 
appointments. 
B. Insulating Big Pharma from Legal Liability: The Leanings of the 
Supreme Court and the Power of the President To Appoint
Generally, Supreme Court Justices attempt to maintain a reputation of 
impartiality, claiming that they make their decisions based on the letter 
of the law.  However, as commonly believed, a Landes-Posner study on
judicial behavior confirmed that despite the Justices’ reputation of
impartiality, they really do appear to vote along ideological lines.170 
With only a few exceptions, over the course of the past seventy years, 
Justices appointed by Republican Presidents tended to vote conservatively, 
while Justices appointed by Democratic Presidents tended to vote
liberally.171  Today, four of the five most conservative Justices since
1937 are on the bench—Justice Thomas ranking the most conservative, 
Justice Scalia ranking third, Chief Justice Roberts ranking fourth, and 
Justice Alito ranking fifth.172  Justice Kennedy, generally known as a 
conservative, though not as extreme as his previously mentioned 
colleagues, is also known for his sometime alignment with the liberal 
faction of the Court.173  These five Justices, making up a majority of the
167. See supra notes 12–24 and accompanying text. 
168. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
169. See Ismail, supra note 151. 
170. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Rational Judicial Behavior: 
A Statistical Study 27 (Univ. of Chi. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 404, 2008),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1126403. 
171. Id. at 27–29; see also Justin Ewers, Ranking the Politics of Supreme Court 
Justices, U.S. NEWS (May 12, 2008), http://www.usnews.com/news/national/articles/2008/ 
05/12/ranking-the-politics-of-supreme-court-justices_print.html (summarizing the Landes- 
Posner study). 
 172. Ewers, supra note 171. 
173. See Nate Silver, Supreme Court May Be Most Conservative in Modern History, 





     















    
 








    
members of the Supreme Court, were appointed by Republican Presidents.174 
The remainder, Justices Ginsberg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan, are
considered liberal and were appointed by Democratic Presidents.175 
PLIVA is a striking example of how the Court’s conservative faction 
dominates the outcome of decisions.  In a five-to-four split, with
conservatives Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito in the majority,176 the Court gave a victory to the
generic-pharmaceutical manufacturers, their conservative allies.177 
Although the Court recognized the large disparity that its decision 
created between brand-name and generic prescription drug users,178 it
reasoned that it would not “distort the Supremacy Clause in order to 
create similar pre-emption” for both kinds of drug manufacturers.179 The
Court’s reasoning turned on its purported adherence to the law, reading 
the federal law strictly with a focus on congressional intent and the 
FDA’s interpretation of its own regulations.180  However, the majority’s
decision in fact fails for faulty reasoning and illogicality.181  Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion reflects the view that “the problem was the court
majority, not lawmakers or agencies.”182  “Today’s decision leads to so
174. See Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Split Definitive, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2011, 
5:27 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/11/supreme_ 
court_s_partisan_divide_and_obama_s_health_care_law.html. 
175. See id.
176. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2571 (2011). 
177. See supra Part V.A (discussing Big Pharma’s lobbying efforts and campaign 
contributions, most of which go to Republican leaders to influence legislation and 
regulations).  For a recent example of this alliance, in November 2010, it was reported 
that the CEO of Pharmaceutical Product Development had given $3.38 million to a
conservative advocacy group, which in turn spent almost $3 million on ads supporting
Republicans and opposing Democrats.  Chris Kromm, NC Pharmaceutical Baron Spends 
$3 Million To Help Republicans, INST. FOR S. STUD. (Nov. 1, 2010, 6:02 PM), http://www.
southernstudies.org/2010/11/nc-pharmaceutical-baron-spends-3-million-to-help-
republicans.html.  However, note that the pharmaceutical industry also has ties to the 
Democratic Party, as the industry also aims to sway Democrats and those who may have
leanings against its political agenda. See Top Recipients of Contributions from Lobbyists, 
2010 Cycle, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/lobby_contribs.php?
cycle=2010&type=P (last visited Sept. 9, 2012) (charting politicians who received money
from lobbyists). 
178. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581 (“We acknowledge the unfortunate hand that federal 
drug regulation has dealt Mensing, Demahy, and others similarly situated.”).
179. Id. at 2582. 
180. See supra Part III.A. 
181. See supra Part III.B. 
 182. Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Protects Generic-Drug Makers from Being Sued for 
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many absurd consequences that I cannot fathom that Congress would 
have intended to preempt state law in these cases.”183 
C. Who Is Left To Regulate? The Interaction of the Court with      
Federal Agency Interpretation and the Resultant     
Failure To Control Big Pharma 
In 1945, the Supreme Court first held that “administrative interpretation 
[of an agency’s own regulations] . . . becomes of controlling weight unless 
it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”184  Since then, 
the courts have given extreme deference to the interpretation of federal 
agencies, even when such deference may be inappropriate.  PLIVA is 
such a case. 
In PLIVA, the Court gave extreme deference to the FDA’s own
interpretation of its regulations, despite the fact that the FDA’s 
interpretation led to illogical and unfair results.185  Because the Court, 
relying on the FDA’s interpretation, determined that there were no 
means available to the manufacturers to change their labels in accordance
with state law without violating federal law, it found conflict preemption 
based on impossibility.186  As a result, generic manufacturers cannot be
sued for state failure-to-warn claims, but brand-name manufacturers
can—a consumer’s right to sue now depends on whether he or she is
prescribed a generic or brand-name drug.187  The FDA’s interpretation is 
inconsistent with its own regulations.  The purpose of its regulations on
label warnings is to protect consumers,188 but its interpretation, 
according to the PLIVA Court, essentially leads to the destruction of the 
strongest form of consumer protection—the right for consumers to sue 
for injuries.  This outcome is utterly illogical.  And although Supreme Court
jurisprudence does give great deference to an agency’s interpretations of
its own regulations, by no means would or could the Court ever vitiate 
its own power as the ultimate adjudicator of the law.  However, in
PLIVA we see the Court doing just that⎯the majority essentially 
183. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2592 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
184. Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945). 
185. See supra Part III.A–B. 
186. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2575–76; see also supra Part III.A. 
187. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2583 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
188. See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 566–68 (2009) (describing the history and

































relegated all of its judicial power to the FDA.189  It is also important to
note that the FDA, as a main target of the Big Pharma lobby,190 is
susceptible to interpreting its regulations favorably to the pharmaceutical 
industry, and in the case of PLIVA, most likely did.  This is a huge problem. 
Handing over such power to the FDA without judicial oversight is
troubling.  Government agencies are often overly influenced by the
industries they are supposed to regulate.191  Budgetary limitations also
make it impossible to keep tabs on such a fast-growing global industry. 
A recent study found that “[i]n FDA applications for new generic drugs, 
nearly 90 percent of the factories providing active ingredients [for the 
drugs] are located overseas, where the agency’s inspection rate dropped 
57 percent between 2001 and 2008.”192  The former Associate
Commissioner for Policy and Planning for the FDA from 1991 to 2005 
stated: “The average citizen would want to know that someone is checking
that manufacturers are making the drugs they got approval to make. . . . 
That’s not happening, and the risk to consumers is potentially huge.”193 
What is worse is that although the FDA purports to have stringent
regulations on generic drug approvals, “the FDA’s reforms have largely
fallen by the wayside. . . .  Between 2000 and 2008, the number of new 
generic drugs put forth for FDA approval went up 40 percent and approvals 
doubled.”194  The fact that the FDA has essentially ignored its consumer
protection role is a problem, and change is needed.195 
189. See supra Part III.A–B. 
190. See Ismail, supra note 151. 
191. Additionally, as seen here, “[f]ederal law empowers the FDA to regulate the 
content of drug warning labels as part of the agency’s approval process for new brand-
name drugs.”  Ken Klukowski, Supreme Court’s Pliva Decision Is Another Blow Against 
Trial Lawyers, AM. C.R. UNION (June 26, 2011) http://theacru.org/acru/supreme_
courts_pliva_decision_is_another_blow_against_trial_lawyers/. However, with the FDA’s
leanings in PLIVA, its role as consumer protector is in doubt. 
 192. Katherine Eban, Are Generic Drugs a Bad Bargain?, NBCNEWS.COM TODAY 
HEALTH (May 26, 2009, 8:50 AM), http://today.msnbc.msn.com/id/30940044/ns/today-
today_health/t/are-generic-drugs-bad-bargain/#.TmgAInNZVe4. 
193. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. (referring to SELF Magazine’s findings). 
195. In fact, Scott Gottlieb, doctor and Deputy Commissioner for Medical and 
Scientific Affairs for the FDA from 2005 to 2007, commented on the pressure for the 
FDA to support Big Pharma: “Generic companies are popular on Capitol Hill because
the industry is powerful and voters are anxious for cheaper drugs.  There was always
pressure on us to reduce barriers to entry . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); 
see also Leonard H. Glantz & George J. Annas, Impossible? Outlawing State Safety
Laws for Generic Drugs, NEW ENG. J. MED. (Aug. 25, 2011), http://healthpolicyand 
reform.nejm.org/?p=15106 (“Congress or the FDA can change the Supreme Court’s 
conclusion.  Better postmarketing surveillance should be combined with a more 
proactive FDA to ensure adequate labeling of all the drugs available for physicians to 
prescribe.”).  However, although finding the political will to make change to protect
consumers should not be impossible, with the power of Big Pharma, it is going to take a 
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VI. THE SERIOUS NEED FOR REASSESSMENT AND 
CHANGE TO PROTECT OUR CONSUMERS 
In a five-to-four vote, led by the conservative Justices, the Court
essentially insulated generic-pharmaceutical manufacturers from any
liability for state tort law claims for failure to warn.196 The
pharmaceutical industry consistently ranks as one of the most profitable 
industries in the world, with projections of future growth, particularly in
the generic drug market197—and PLIVA is its most recent victory.  The
victims of PLIVA are average American citizens who use generic drugs
to cut costs or use them without even knowing because their insurance 
company requires it.198  The consumers are women like Mensing and
Demahy, who suffered a neurological disorder as a result of their generic 
drug prescription, and families like that of the Iraq war soldier whose 
child was born with serious birth defects as a result of the mother’s
generic drug prescription.199  Over the years, consumers’ rights have
been chiseled away for the benefit of an industry that has grown more 
profitable and more powerful.  Now, the vast majority of the U.S.
population can no longer seek justice and exercise state rights when an 
inadequately labeled generic drug causes them harm.
Our Congress, our federal agencies, and our courts have some serious 
considerations to make.  Justice Thomas acknowledged the “unfortunate 
hand” that was dealt to the patients whose suits were dismissed,
conceding that divergent treatment of brand-name and generic companies 
likely makes “little sense” to consumers.200  However, Justice Thomas 
also stated that “[i]t is not this Court’s task to decide whether the
statutory scheme established by Congress is unusual or even bizarre.”201 
Justice Thomas further noted that Congress and the FDA could “change 
the law and regulations if they so desire.”202 
196. See PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2582 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting). 
197. Zacks Equity Research, supra note 1.
 198. EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS, supra note 4, at 3–4. 
199. See Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 430 (5th Cir. 2010), rev’d sub nom.
PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. 2567; Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 605 (8th Cir. 2009), rev’d sub 
nom. PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. 2567; supra text accompanying note 125. 
200. See PLIVA, 131 S. Ct. at 2581. 
201. Id. at 2582  (quoting Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, 557 U.S. 519, 556 








   
 
 



















Lawmakers should welcome this invitation to close legal loopholes 
and assure accountability from those reaping financial rewards.  Any new
laws could take years to work their way through the legislative process if
elected officials do not stand up to the power wielded by the well-heeled
pharma lobby.  What physicians, pharmacists, and patients need, however, 
is not delay or diluted legal language.  Congress promoted the rise of
generics; now it has a responsibility to protect consumers from the dangers 
they pose.  We need updated, enforceable laws requiring all pharmaceuticals 
to be safe and effective, and requiring labels—brand-name and generic—to
stay accurate, complete, and current as new knowledge comes to light,
even after patents expire.  If drug manufacturers do not meet their
obligations, they should face consequences, and all consumers must be
allowed to seek remedy in court. 
In August 2011, Public Citizen, a consumer organization, petitioned 
the FDA to counteract PLIVA by authorizing generic drug manufacturers 
to revise generic drug labeling through the CBE and prior-approval-
supplement (PAS) procedures.203  The FDA should respond by updating
its administrative process to reflect the current pharmaceutical landscape
in which generics now comprise three-fourths of all prescription drugs 
sold.  The agency should require that generic manufacturers do more
than just photocopy the branded label, especially for drugs that have
been “off patent” for years.  A substantial number of branded drugs are 
now essentially retired, with scant attention paid by the original 
manufacturer to medical research and adverse event reports.  The FDA
needs to ensure that under its regulations each one of the ever-growing 
number of generic drugs has a manufacturer fulfilling the duty to be an
expert on current risks.  With limited funds and reach, the FDA needs 
rules that clearly place accountability on the entire pharmaceutical industry 
for the financially lucrative products it sells, and for the labels on those 
products.
Other health stakeholders cannot ignore PLIVA.  Health insurers and 
state health programs now must rethink whether it is wise to cut costs by 
mandating patients to use generics when these generics are now shielded 
from state failure-to-warn laws.  Not only do they have an ethical obligation
to disclose the generic manufacturer’s lack of liability to patients, but
insurers and taxpayers could themselves end up footing the bill for harm
caused by prescription drugs.  Now, physicians and pharmacists must
hesitate before automatically prescribing or filling a generic drug.  In 
fact, health professionals at all levels must update counseling to let 
203. Generic Drug Manufacturers Should Be Able To Warn of Products’ Risks, 
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unsuspecting consumers know that generics and brand-name prescription
drugs have an important difference.  Patients must educate themselves
on pharmaceutical products now more than ever, and weigh the risks 
involved in choosing generics when they know that the manufacturer has 
little or no legal responsibility.  In the meantime, generic manufacturers 
are moving for dismissal of failure-to-warn claims, while attorneys for 
patients who have been harmed are looking at alternative ways to defend 
their rights, ways that do not rely on label inadequacies. 
911
 912
